Re-Doing Kabul

by Ajmal Maiwandi, Afghan-American architext

Animals grazing in parks intended for people, bathers using the dirty waters of the Kabul River to do their washing, and the spontaneous appropriation of empty or abandoned buildings.
Mud and dirt from destroyed buildings were used immediately in the construction and repairs of other structures. It was this constant small-scale informal reconstruction, displacement, and recycling that managed to keep parts of Kabul from being completely erased.
The self-built housing could play a critical role in the new vision of the city.  The city should acknowledge forces such as squatters as an incredible resource within the context of the limited resources of the municipal government and the creation of a developmental framework within which these forces can aid in the reconstruction.
The destruction of the past 20 years offers the city a rare opportunity to re-establish itself as a technically advanced yet culturally specific environment.

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June 10, 2002

"The Loya Jirga is being treated as a ratification tool for backroom
political deals."

Omar Zakhilwal*

I am a member of the Loya Jirga's silent majority - or rather, silenced
majority - who came to Kabul expecting to shape our nation's future but
instead find ourselves being dragged back into the past.

We came from all parts of the country to claim our freedom and democracy,
but instead are being met with systematic threats and intimidation aimed
at undermining our free choice.  We came strengthened by international
declarations on human rights, but instead are facing international
complicity in the denial of our rights.  We came to represent the diverse
interests of the entire Afghan nation, 1,500 delegates for 25 million
people, but instead are being pressured to support the narrow agenda of
warlords and their foreign sponsors.  We came to inaugurate an inclusive
and professional transitional government, but instead are being compelled
to rubberstamp the Bonn Agreement's unjust power-sharing arrangements.

The fundamental question we face is this: will the new government be
dominated by the same warlords and factional politics responsible for two
decades of violence and impunity, or can we break with this legacy and
begin to establish a system of law and professional governance?

The Afghan people have spoken clearly on this issue.  I recently
participated in a UN-commissioned assessment mission by the Center for
Economic and Social Rights, a human rights group based in New York.  Our
report documents widespread agreement among all Afghans, from urban
professionals to landless farmers, that there should be no role for
warlords in the country's future, and that international aid will be
wasted unless the underlying conditions of peace and security are first
established.

The same consensus holds in the Loya Jirga.  I estimate that at least 80%
of delegates favor excluding all warlords from the government.  The 200
women delegates are especially outspoken on this issue.  In a spontaneous
display of democracy, they publicly rebuked two powerful symbols of
Afghanistan's violent past - Burhannudin Rabbani, former President of the
Mujahideen government from 1992-96, and Gen. Mohammed Fahim, former
intelligence chief during this period and currently Defense Minister in
the interim government.

But due to behind-the-scenes pressure, our voices are being silenced and
the warlords empowered.  Let me give some concrete examples.
- When the Loya Jirga opened, support for former King Zahir Shah was
extremely strong.  Rather than address the issue democratically, almost
two days of the six-day Loya Jirga were wasted while a parade of
high-level officials from the interim government, the United Nations, and
the United States visited Zahir Shah and eventually "persuaded" him to
publicly renounce his political ambitions.
- When the Loya Jirga recommenced, the delegates were surprised to see
Afghanistan's thirty provincial governors, none of whom were elected to
serve in the grand assembly.  It soon became apparent that their purpose
was to serve as arm-twisters for the interim government, which is
dominated by warlords from the Northern Alliance.  "You are all with me.
You will do as I tell you to do. If you dare not to follow me we all go
back to our province after this [Loya Jirga], don't we?", is a direct
quote from a governor to the delegates of his province.
These men controlled less than 10% of the country before the fall of the
Taliban, and therefore have little direct influence over most Loya Jirga
members, especially those from rural areas in the South, East and West.
The governors, on the other hand, are able to leverage their local
military and financial power to pressure delegates from their provinces to
support handpicked candidates allied to the Northern Alliance.  Their
persuasive abilities are enhanced by scores of Interior Ministry agents
who are circulating throughout the Loya Jirga compound and openly
intimidating outspoken delegates.
- Equally discouraging is the role played by the involved international
organizations and the expectations set forth by them. An adviser to UN
chief Lakhdar Brahimi told me in no uncertain terms that the Loya Jirga
was not aimed to bring about fundamental political changes like ridding
the government of warlords.  Meanwhile, Zalmay Khalilzad, US Special Envoy
on Afghanistan, has caused some disappointment in the Loya Jirga through
pressure tactics aimed at undercutting popular support for Zahir Shah.

The Loya Jirga is being treated as a ratification tool for backroom
political deals.  As one example, the media has reported on the
"voluntary" decision of Interior Minister Yunus Qanooni to drop his
candidacy.  But it is not being reported that he will assume an equally
powerful post in the new government, or that his intended replacement is
himself a member of Qanuni's Northern Alliance faction (as is Fahim and
Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah).

On the first day of the Loya Jirga, we were filled with hope and
enthusiasm.  Most of us stayed up past midnight in spirited debates about
the country's future.  By the third day, a palpable demoralization has set
in.  Our time is being wasted on trivial procedural matters.  We feel
manipulated and harassed.  Our historic responsibility to the Afghan
nation is becoming a charade.

We are in Kabul because we believe that participation and democracy are
more than words on paper.  We are not asking for much, after all.  Simply
the right to determine our own government and future in accordance with
the human rights ideals so loudly trumpeted by the international
community.  The same rights as all other people.

* Omar Zakhilwal, a professor of economics in Ottawa, Canada, participated
in a comprehensive assessment mission to Afghanistan for the Center for
Economic and Social Rights, a human rights group based in New York.